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INTRODUCTION
PROFESSOR MORIARTY: Good afternoon, everyone. I'm Jane
Moriarty, and I have the pleasure of being the afternoon moderator,
as well as having the distinct pleasure of introducing our keynote
speaker.
We are thrilled that Professor Garner could join us, and we're
really honored he took time out of his schedule-let me tell you, you
can't imagine the schedule he keeps-to join us at Duquesne Law
School. For those of us who love law, language, and advocacy, which
is everyone in this room, this is a very special day.
I first met Bryan Garner about 20 years ago. I was a practicing
lawyer at a firm, and we had hired Professor Garner as a consult-
ant.
I was asked to write him a very short letter, so I dashed off four
sentences. It took four and a half hours-because what could be
more intimidating than writing to the best, most highly regarded
legal writer in America? Professor Garner, however, was incredibly
gracious, informative, helpful, and so very impressive, as you will
see today.
I also had the pleasure of serving as a contributing author of
Black's Law Dictionary, for which Professor Garner is the outstand-
ing editor in chief. It is only in a room like this that I can hold up
my dictionary with my name embossed in gold letters and feel the
waves of energy in the room. As everyone is saying, we are geeks,
* Distinguished Research Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Dedman
School of Law; president, LawProse Inc. This article is adapted from the author's October 8,
2015 presentation at Duquesne University.
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but we are very cool geeks. And now we have bling. But enough
about me. Let's get to Professor Garner.
Bryan Garner graduated from the University of Texas in 1980,
when he was seven-yes, that was a joke-where he was elected to
Phi Beta Kappa. He also received his law degree from the Univer-
sity of Texas and served as an editor on the law review. And he
clerked for the Honorable Thomas M. Reavley of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Over the last several decades, he has been a law
professor both at his alma mater and at Southern Methodist Uni-
versity, where he is Distinguished Research Professor of Law.
More of you know him for what he writes and what he says when
he speaks. He's the author of several exceptionally well-known
books on legal writing, grammar, and appellate advocacy. To name
just a few, Garner's Modern English Usage; The Winning Brief; The
Winning Oral Argument; The Elements of Legal Style; and two
books written with Justice Antonin Scalia of the Supreme Court of
the United States, entitled Making Your Case: The Art of Persuad-
ing Judges and Reading Law: The Art of Interpreting Legal Texts.
And let's not forget the ever-popular Rules of Golf in Plain English.
That, too, is Professor Garner's.
In addition, he has received numerous awards including the
2015 Exemplary Legal Writing, Green Bag Almanac, for Black's
Law Dictionary, the tenth edition; the 2010 Burton Award, Legal
Writing Author of the Decade; and a 2005 Lifetime Achievement
Award from the Center for Plain Language. And again, that is only
the beginning of the awards.
Professor Garner has served as the chief drafting consultant to
the Judicial Conference of the United States, specifically to the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, which
we've been talking about all morning, and worked for the last sev-
eral years as the chief consultant on the large-scale restyling project
with which we are all so familiar. And as I mentioned before, he is,
of course, the editor in chief of Black's Law Dictionary, the most
authoritative resource to which we all turn.
For decades, Professor Garner has influenced the way we think
about law, language, and advocacy. He moves us away from obfus-
cation and gears us toward powerful, clear writing. He continues to
have an enormous impact-not only on how we write, but on how
we conceptualize law and advocacy-by teaching us to be effective
by trying to be helpful to the reader.
For several decades, he has cast a strong beacon of light for legal
writers by showing a clearer way forward. It is now up to us to fol-
low that lead.
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I hope you will join me in welcoming Professor Bryan Garner.
PROFESSOR GARNER: Thank you, Professor Moriarty. I'm going
to avoid the lectern now and maybe for good-for reasons that will
become clear in a moment.
When I'm trying to teach lawyers to write effective briefs, pow-
erful briefs, I feel a little bit like a golf professional in Fritzville. Let
me explain.
When I was a boy, I played a lot of competitive golf-a lot of
tournament golf with my brother Brad. He and I would go all
around Texas playing in tournaments. One of my rivals was Stanley
Fritz. (I've fictionalized the name only slightly.) Stanley's father
had the most curious golf swing. There's a way to hit a golf ball and
hit it well, but Mr. Fritz didn't use it: he had the most distinctive
swing ever.
He stood with his right thumb underneath the club and his legs
absolutely stiff. You're not supposed to do that, but Mr. Fritz had
spent 35 years hitting the golf ball that way. And then he would
pick up the club-jerk it straight up-exactly what you're not sup-
posed to do. Then he would bring the club straight down in an al-
most vertical motion and jab the clubhead into the turf itself-only
sometimes hitting the ball.
I saw a golf professional, our local professional, tell him, "Mr.
Fritz, if you'll lower the left shoulder a little bit, bend your knees
slightly, and try gripping the club like so, try bringing it back low
to the ground, and then sweep the ball off the tee. That's the way
you're going to be able to hit the golf ball well." But Mr. Fritz-no,
no, no. Every time he would stand at the ball, it was in a duffer's
pose. His club would jerk up and come straight down with a thud.
At impact, his left foot would come off the ground. The swing was
essentially that way every time-unbelievable.
Now, the Garner family has always been preoccupied with tech-
nique, whether in golf or in other skills. My brother ended up being
a flute professor. He goes around the world teaching flutists how to
play the flute. I teach lawyers how to write.
Imagine with me a town called Fritzville, where there are ten
golf courses-five municipal courses and five private country
clubs-and everybody in Fritzville swings like Mr. Fritz.
In the Fritzville city championship, anybody who tries to hit the
ball properly is immediately disqualified. No, you can't lower your
shoulder-you've got to swing the club the Fritz way, with the ver-
tical chopping motion. By local rule, that's the way you must hit a
golf ball in Fritzville.
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So what does this have to do with writing? Well, I'm analogizing
the condition of legal writers to that of other professional nonfiction
writers.
Lawyers are the most highly paid professional writers in the
world, and I'm saying that I feel like a golf pro in Fritzville with a
student telling me, "Look, I want to play golf well. I want to do re-
ally well competitively. But you must teach me to hit the ball with
my same basic swing. Please don't change my swing." Well, you
can't do that. It doesn't work. Certain techniques are necessary to
hit the ball well.
I say lawyers essentially live in Fritzville. But I have three pro-
posals that would get us on the train out of there.
PROPOSAL #1: THE DEEP ISSUE
The first proposal: Advocates should use deep issues-that is,
multisentence issue statements culminating in a question mark by
the 75th word. The one-sentence issue should be banned.
Subproposal 1A: Courts should adopt an appellate rule both re-
quiring and demonstrating deep issues. (Without examples in the
rules, lawyers won't know what to do.)
Subproposal 1B: Courts should change appellate rules to re-
quire what the United States Supreme Court requires: the ques-
tions presented should be the very first thing that appears after the
caption of the case. Justice William Brennan is responsible for that
feature in the U.S. Supreme Court Rules. Through his reform in the
early 1970s, the Supreme Court Rules have required that when you
open a Supreme Court brief, the first thing you see is the question
presented.
Subproposal 1C: Moot-court programs should begin penalizing
all one-sentence issue statements-and doubly penalizing those
that begin with the word Whether. Those should be banished.
Now let's talk about why. The issues in a given case are the most
important things. What do judges do? They decide issues. What's
the issue? Any reasonable judge wants to know immediately upon
picking up a brief what the question to be decided is. I'm going to
ask you to become a judge for a moment and think about the typical
judge's reading life.
A couple of years ago, I was teaching judicial-opinion writing in
a certain Midwestern state, and the judges told me to my horror
about their "warehousing" problem. I said, "Warehousing problem?
What's the problem?" Well, some of their predecessors had gotten
far behind in deciding appeals in the intermediate courts. So now,
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once the clerk's office has all the briefs, they get banded together,
put in a box, and sent to a warehouse for 18 months. No one looks
at the briefs for 18 months. They're that badly backlogged because
of their predecessors. Shocking.
So I want you to assume for a moment that you're a judge with
such a backlog and you're trying to get caught up to speed on your
docket. Have a look at Figure 1. It's scary. Obviously, a terroristic
psychopath wrote this brief. Isn't it interesting how lawyers in ap-
peals like to telegraph to the reader immediately, "I have no idea
what I'm doing. I just don't know. I have no taste. I have no judg-
ment. But I hope you'll believe me." Even before you read a word,
this page proclaims the writer's ineptitude.
Look at the first issue: "Whether the court of appeals erred in
concluding that the root cause analysis team ('RCA Team'), which
was created by and operates under the guidelines of the RCA pol-
icy"-What are you talking about?-"did not qualify as a medical
review committee pursuant to N.C.G.S. . . ." I don't know what
you're talking about.
I have no idea what this is about, but this is a typical issue-
incomprehensible. I don't know what it means. Lawyers, sadly, are
in the habit of doing this. Almost every brief in this country has
early sentences that are incomprehensible until you read much fur-
ther-and these incomprehensible sentences appear especially in
issue statements.
You can't possibly understand what that issue means until you
read the whole middle of the brief. That's incompetent exposition.
If you were to subscribe to a newsmagazine and then realize that
every article begins with some early sentences that are incompre-
hensible ("Keep reading. Keep reading. It will come together for you
later."), you would cancel your subscription. You couldn't read that.
You wouldn't want to.
I'll tell you what: I don't think we can decide this first case just
now. We're going to take it under advisement-or maybe send it
back to the warehouse.
Let's go to the next one.
Figure 2: "Did the Michigan Court of Appeals correctly hold that
the Michigan Tax Tribunal has the authority to order the waiver of
interest in a tax tribunal proceeding?" I don't know. What are you
talking about? I have no idea.
By the way, it says the Michigan Court of Appeals said yes. I
don't believe that either. I do not believe the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals said that the Michigan Court of Appeals correctly held some-
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DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS JOHN DAVID, WENDY HATCH, AND
POLK COUNTY HOSPITAL SYSTEM, INC.'S NEW BRIEF
ISSUES PRESENTED
I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS TEAM ("RCA TEAM"), WHICH
WAS CREATED BY AND OPERATES UNDER THE GUIDELINES OF
THE RCA POLICY, DID NOT QUALIFY AS A MEDICAL REVIEW
COMMITTEE PURSUANT TO N.C.G.S. § 131E-76(5)(c)?
II. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT DOCUMENTS PRODUCED AND CONSIDERED BY THE RCA
TEAM DURING THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS, INCLUDING THE
RCA REPORT AND QUALITY CARE CONTROL ("QCC") REPORTS,
WERE NOT PRIVILEGED PURSUANT TO N.C.G.S. § 131E-95?
Figure 1
Like all the examples reproduced here, this is a precise replica
of how the issue statements looked in the brief as filed. Note how the
all-caps style on the bottom half of the page induces you to avert
your eyes. You must overcome a strong resistance to read the most
important information on this page.
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Counter-Statement of Questions Involved
I. DID THE MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HOLD THAT THE
MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER THE WAIVER
OF INTEREST IN A TAX TRIBUNAL PROCEEDING?
Plaintiff-Appellee says "yes."
Defendant-Appellant says "no."
The Macomb County Circuit Court said "no."
The Michigan Court of Appeals said "yes."
I. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HOLD THAT JURISDICTION
TO ENFORCE A TRIBUNAL DECISION MUST GO BEFORE A CIRCUIT
COURT, AS THE TRIBUNAL HAS NO ENFORCEMENT POWER?
Plaintiff-Appellee says "yes."
Defendant-Appellant says "no."
The Macomb County Circuit Court said "no."
The Michigan Court of Appeals said "yes."
III. WHERE A COUNTY WORKS HAND IN HAND WITH A TOWNSHIP IN
ASSESSING AND COLLECTING PROPERTY TAXES, AND WHERE THE
COUNTY IS SERVED WITH A COPY OF THE TRIBUNAL PETITION AND
CHOOSES NOT TO APPEAR, DID THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY
HOLD THAT THE COUNTY IS IN PRIVITY WITH THE TOWNSHIP AND




The Macomb County Circuit Court did not rule on this question.
The Michigan Court of Appeals said "yes."
Figure 2
Again, the all-caps text is off-putting and relatively unreadable.
The first eight words of the first two issue statements have no valu-
able information-and because those two statements start with the
last thing done in the litigation, they are in reverse chronological
order. The third is typographically impenetrable and chronologically
jumbled.
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think that's correct. I don't think we can decide this case just now.
There are so many others pressing on us.
Let's try to find a case that we can decide.
Figure 3: "May the Michigan legislature constitutionally enact
a statute which creates a lawmaking reckless driving causing death
a 15 . . . ." What is this talking about? I have no idea.
Oh, it was only when my wife looked at this page and said,
"Bryan, there's actually supposed to be a space there: 'a law making
reckless driving causing death."' I thought it was a typo at first:
"death to a 15-year old." But no: "death a 15." "Death a 15-year fel-
ony." I'm having a hard time reading this. I'm having a hard time
taking the writer seriously.
Let's get to B [in Fig. 3], "creating a lesser." I'm sorry. What?
This isn't even grammatically parallel to A. I shouldn't be so both-
ered by this, but I am.
By the way, should lawyers be required to make their grammar
parallel? Surely not. It's way beneath their pay grade. No. Just as
NBA players don't have to know how to dribble. Dribbling is a low-
level activity. These are really highly paid athletes. They shouldn't
have to be bothered with such basics as dribbling, should they?
They want to play basketball at a high level and be the best in the
world. Do lawyers need to know how to punctuate? Nah, it's beneath
their pay grade.
And C [still Fig. 3]-I have no idea what this is saying. It looks
as if it's about a lesser-included offense, but there's a reference to a
lessor-no lessee in sight. Let's find another page. We're trying to
move our docket along a little bit.
Figure 4: Oh dear. Well, let's look at the first issue. My goodness.
There are only two jurisdictions in which Courier font is required.
Again, this reeks of "I have no judgment. I have no taste. I have egg
dripping down the side of my face from breakfast this morning, but
please take me seriously." It's a little bit difficult, actually.
"Whether the Court of Appeals and the Superior Court were cor-
rect in concluding the Agricultural . . . ." "In concluding the Agricul-
tural"? They concluded the Agricultural Commission? They
wrapped up the Commission? They concluded it. I think this author
is a that-bigot. That-bigots don't write well. They don't care that
that is necessary. People who are that-bigots, I'm sure they're the
same people who park over wheelchair-access ramps. They have no
concern for others.
Okay [still Fig. 4]: ". . . Erred in its conclusion of law 3(B)"-
What are you talking about?-"that the petitioner did not demon-
strate . . . ." Wait a second. "Erred in its conclusion of law 3(B) that
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STATEMENT OF QUESTION PRESENTED
MAY THE MICHIGAN LEGISLATURE CONSTITUTIONALLY ENACT A
STATUTE WHICH:
A. CREATES A LAWMAKING RECKLESS DRIVING CAUSING
DEATH A 15 YEAR FELONY, WHICH SIMULTANEOUSLY
B. CREATING A LESSER, INCLUDED MISDEMEANOR MOV-
ING VIOLATION CAUSING DEATH AND
C. DICTATES THAT IN A PROSECUTION FOR THE FORMER,
GREATER OFFENSE, THE JURY SHALL NOT BE IN-
STRUCTED ON THE LATTER, LESSOR, INCLUDED OF-
FENSE?
* DOES THE ABOVE LEGISLATIVE SCHEME VIOLATE THE
MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION, AS SET FORTH IN THE DOCTRINE
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS?
Defendant Jeffries answers "yes"
The Court of Appeals answers "yes"
* DOES THE ABOVE LEGISLATION UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
DERIVE A DEFENDANT OF THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY ON
ALL ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CHARGED CRIME?
Defendant Jeffries answers "yes"
The Court of Appeals answers "yes"
* IS THE CRIME OF MOVING VIOLATION CAUSING DEATH A
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THE CRIME OF RECKLESS
DRIVING CAUSING DEATH?
Defendant Jeffries answers "yes"
The Court of Appeals answers "yes"
The People answer "yes"
Figure 3
Here we have an unappealing page that is hard to figure out-
and it becomes even harder the more closely you read it. There are
three questions (A, B, C) and then three bulleted questions about
those three questions. There are typos throughout.
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1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SUPERIOR COURT WERE
CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THE AGRICULTURAL AND FORESTRY AWARENESS
COMMISSION ("AFAC") ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW 3(B) THAT THE
PETITIONER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT STRICT APPLICATION
15A NCAC 7H.1705 (a) (7) WOULD RESULT IN AN UNNECESSARY
HARDSHIP TO THE JAMES PROPERTY?
2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SUPERIOR COURT WERE
CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THE AFAC ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION OF
LAW 6 THAT THE PETITIONERS DID NOT MEET THE FOURTH
REQUIREMENT OF A VARIANCE REQUEST THAT THE GRANTING OF
THE VARIANCE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE SPIRIT, PURPOSE AND
INTENT OF THE RULES, STANDARDS OR ORDER; WILL SECURE
PUBLIC SAFETY AND WELFARE; WILL PRESERVE SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTICE?
3. WHETHER THE SUPERIOR COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THE
AFAC'S DECISION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
AND IN CONCLUDING THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO GRANT
THE VARIANCE?
Figure 4
So many things about this page are repellent that it's hard to
know where to begin. It's hard to fathom why some judicial readers
have a feeling of nostalgia when they encounter a Courier typeface.
Notice the unsightly effect of justifying the right margin with this
nonproportional typeface.
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the Petitioner did not demonstrate that strict application 15A. . ."-
What are you talking about?-"would result in an unnecessary. . ."
I have no idea. I don't know. This is going to require a lot further
study.
You might say, "Bryan, you're just a lazy reader." Well, guess
what: all readers are. All readers are selfish. They like things made
easy for them.
Let's go to Figure 5.
I'm scared already. Look how strangely the page is laid out. "Did
the trial court properly grant Jersey's summary judgment motion
on Xuxu's equitable bill of review where the evidence conclu-
sively . . . ." I'm going to have to get back to this one. I'm trying to
find a case I can decide.
Let's go to the next one.
Figure 6: "Whether the Grommets met their burden of estab-
lishing that the parties' arbitration agreement was unenforceable
because of an alleged . . . ." I don't know. I have no idea. What are
you talking about? We're supposed to read on.
Do you know what lawyers do? Lawyers treat their readers-
judges, mainly, and law clerks-as paid readers. "Look, Judge,
you're a paid civil servant. It's your job to read the stuff that I file.
It's not my job to make it interesting to you or even comprehensible.
You figure out what it's all about. It's your job, Judge." That's very
rude. It's also very unskillful.
The second issue: "Even if the parties' agreed-upon arbitra-
tor . . . ." Okay. I'm stopping. Why are you using an en-dash there
instead of a hyphen? That should be a hyphen. It's a phrasal adjec-
tive. I shouldn't be worried about this. Here's somebody using an
en-dash, which should be for a span of numbers or years, where it
should be a hyphen. I shouldn't be thinking about this, but I'm
thinking about it.
"Even if the parties' arbitrator were unavailable . . . ." Stop right
there. This is the present subjunctive. This should not be the pre-
sent subjunctive. It should be past historical, "was unavailable":
even if he was, in fact, unavailable. If it's going to be subjunctive, it
should be past subjunctive: even if the parties' agreed-upon arbitra-
tor had been unavailable. I'm finding it harder to get into the sen-
tence because I'm hung up on this weird mixed use of the subjunc-
tive.
By the way, should lawyers have to know how to use the sub-




1. Did the trial court properly grant Jersey's summary
judgment motion on Xuxu's equitable bill of review where the
evidence conclusively established the following facts:
i. Xuxu voluntarily appeared in the underlying proceeding
by filing an answer to Jersey's petition,
ii. Xuxu thereafter participated in the underlying
proceeding;
iii. Xuxu was ordered to obtain counsel or face default
because of its pro se appearance;
iv. Xuxu disregarded the order;
v. Xuxu timely received notice of the trial setting;
vi. Xuxu received a default judgment for its disregard of the
trial court's warning;
vii. Xuxu timely received notice of the final judgment
against Xuxu in the underlying case; and
viii. Xuxu neither moved for new trial nor appealed the final
judgment.
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding that the trial
court was not required to consider Xuxu's First Amended Petition
in the bill of review proceeding because it was filed (i) after the
hearing on Jersey's motion, (ii) without leave of court, and (iii)
without Xuxu asking for leave of court?
Figure 5
Somebody has made a great many poor choices here-in style, in
content, and in presentation. The "issues" are incomprehensible un-
til much else has been read, and they may well remain incompre-
hensible even after that.
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Issues Presented
Issue Presented Number One:
Whether the Grommets met their burden of establishing that the parties'
arbitration agreement was unenforceable because of an alleged impossibility
of performance?
Issue Presented Number Two:
Even if the parties' agreed-upon arbitrator were unavailable, did the trial
court err in denying Jones' motion to compel arbitration when the trial
court had (1) the option to sever the allegedly invalid arbitration provision
and enforce the remainder of the parties' agreement to arbitrate, and (2) the
duty under the Texas and Federal Arbitration Acts to appoint a substitute
arbitrator?
Issue Presented Number Three:
Did the trial court commit a clear abuse of discretion correctable by
mandamus when it invalidated the parties' arbitration agreement merely
because the parties' agreed-upon arbitrator is allegedly unavailable?
Figure 6
By comparison with Figures 1-5, this one looks promising. At
least the page has been laid out attractively. But the one-sentence
issues are little if any help to the reader.
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I'm finding it very difficult to get through these issues, though.
I'm just trying to get my mind around them. Let's look at another
brief.
Figure 7: "Where an out-of-state plaintiff alleges that an out-of-
state defendant committed an out-of-state tort resulting in an out-
of-state injury, can the defendant be subject to specific personal ju-
risdiction in Texas based on the plaintiff's allegation that the de-
fendant partially planned the out-of-state tort?" I don't know. I
don't think so, but I'm not sure. I don't know what happened or
where anybody was when it did.
The next case, Figure 8: "Did the trial court err in ruling that
the Ocean View Good Jobs Ordinance is void as to"-What are you
talking about?-"as to employers and employees conducting busi-
ness within the boundaries of Ocean View International Airport in
the absence of substantial evidence and findings by the trial"-
What are you talking about?-"by the trial court as to whether any
portion of the Ordinance would 'interfer[e] with respect to the oper-
ation of' the airport so as to be proscribed?" I have no idea. What
does this mean? I pity the judges who are having to review briefs
like this. What in the world is this talking about?
What's the most important part of a brief? The issues, the ques-
tions presented. Should we make them comprehensible? Lawyers
don't seem to think so. I'm not just selectively pointing out horrific
examples. My third-year law student who found all these examples
from 2014 briefs said that this is all she could find.
Again, I'm just a judge trying to get on top of my docket. I'm just
trying to find a place to start.
Figure 9, No. 1: "Whether an insurer which . . . ." Okay. I
shouldn't stop here. I'm stopping again. In American English, we
differentiate between restrictive and nonrestrictive relative pro-
nouns. I shouldn't stop on the which. I'm stopped. I'm going to try
to read past it.
Lawyers say, "Look. Look at the substance. Don't get caught up
on these little things." But it's like a person showing somebody the
view from a bay window: "Look at the grand view. Look at the
mountains." But there's something rubbed all over the glass. "What
is that stuff? Did you rub it there? What is that?" "No, no, no. Don't
focus on that. Look at the mountains, the beautiful-" "But what is
that stuff on the glass?"
Okay. "Whether an insurer which refused to provide for the de-
fense of its insured notwithstanding its obligations to do so under
the applicable policy, is ... ." Okay. You don't put a comma between
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ISSUES PRESENTED
I. Where an out-of-state plaintiff alleges that an out-of-state defendant
committed an out-of-state tort resulting in an out-of-state injury, can the
defendant be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Texas based on the
plaintiff's allegation that he defendant partially planned the out-of-state tort
in Texas? (Part I of the Argument)
II. Can a trial court exercise specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant based merely on the plaintiff's conclusory allegation that the
defendant's Texas contacts will be important to the litigation, where
conducting the required legal analysis of the plaintiff's claims would
demonstrate that the defendant's alleged Texas contacts are not substantially
connected to the operative facts of the litigation? (Part II of the Argument)
III. Applying correct legal principles of personal jurisdiction, should this Court
render judgment dismissing the Draco Defendants for lack of personal
jurisdiction? (Part II of the Argument)
IV. Alternatively, should this Court reverse the trial court's order denying the
Draco Defendants' special appearance when:
A. The Court of Appeals relied on speculative implied findings that are
not clearly supported by evidence even though the trial court's special
appearance ruling is based on a paper record rather than live witness
testimony, an issue raised but not decided by this Court in Moncrief
Oil International Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 150 n.4
(Tex. 2013)? (PartIV.A of the Argument)
B. Nucola failed to plead jurisdictional facts by pleading globally or en
masse that the "Draco Defendants," as a group, had certain contacts
with Texas, rather than separately identifying the contacts that each
particular defendant is alleged to have with Texas, attempting to cure
this pleading defect only by dumping into the record 4,000 pages of
documents that it alleged, without specificity, show each defendant's
individual contacts with Texas? (Part lV.B of the Argument)
Figure 7
This intimidating page contains a lot of information packed into
single sentences. Try reading it. You'll almost certainly feel driven
to look somewhere else. Although the lawyer complains about con-
clusory allegations, the page is full of them.
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parties agree that this case warrants direct review pursuant to RAP
4.2(a)(4), because it involves fundamental and urgent issues of broad
public import which require a prompt and ultimate determination. See
Committee's Statement of Grounds for Direct Review, filed January 15,
2014; City of Ocean View's Statement of Grounds for Direct Review, filed
January 22, 2014; Respondents' answers to statements of grounds for
direct review, filed January 28 and 29, 2014. The Committee seeks
accelerated review, and has requested the matter be heard on the earliest
possible date during the Court's Spring Term. See Motion for Accelerated
Review, filed herewith.
H. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. Did the trial court err in ruling that the Ocean View Good Jobs
Ordinance, SMC 7.45, is void as to employers and employees
conducting business within the boundaries of Ocean View
International Airport in the absence of substantial evidence and
findings by the trial court as to whether any portion of the
Ordinance would "interfer[e] with respect to the operation of' the
airport so as to be prosribed by RCW 14.08.330?
2. Did the trial court err in ruling that the Ocean View Good Jobs
Ordinance, SMC 7.45, is inapplicable and void as to employers
and employees conducting business within the boundaries of
Ocean View International Airport because it is proscribed by
RCW 14.08.330?
3. Did the trial court err in ruling that the anti-retaliation provisions
of the Ocean View Good Jobs Ordinance, SMC 7.45.090(A) and (B),
are preempted because they impose "supplemental sanctions" 
employers for violations of the National Labor Relations Act?
Figure 8
This set of three issues might lead you to conclude that the rhe-
torical mismatches complained of throughout this piece derive
simply from my conviction that the "questions presented" or "assign-
ments of error" should be fully understandable if the judicial reader
flips straight to them. Obviously not everybody shares that view.
Something preceded the "II" here-namely "I." But believe me, a
careful reading of "I" doesn't make "II" any more enlightening with
this particular brief. It almost never does.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction lies over Guarantee's Appeal pursuant to CPLR § 5601(a), as the
Order represented a final determination, with respect to which two justices
dissented on questions of law in favor of Guarantee. (R363-84.)
Jurisdiction lies over G3/OPOG's Cross-Appeal pursuant to the Court of
Appeals' grant of leave to appeal, per its order dated June 7, 2012 (R387). See
CPLR § 5602(a)(1)(i).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether an insurer which refused to provide for the defense of its
insured notwithstanding its obligations to do so under the applicable policy, is
liable for a default judgment obtained on covered claims, where the claims as
alleged involved no factual assertions which brought them within any exclusion
and where circumstances, ubsequently asserted by the carrier in defending against
an action pursuant o Insurance Law § 3420, that would have given rise to
exclusions, could have been raised in defense of the claims against the insured, but
were not?
The Appellate Division held yes.
2. Whether an exclusion from an insurance indemnity obligation of
claims based upon the insured's status as officer, director or shareholder of an
entity, is triggered when such status is not the basis for a claim against he insured
Figure 9
The first issue here is a single sentence fragment of 88 words.
It's a fragment because it's a direct question phrased as an indirect
question (beginning with whether) but ending with a question mark.
The main clause has three primary subordinate clauses hanging off
it (the first two beginning with where, the last beginning with but
[three words from the end]). The first subordinate clause has one
clause embedded within it, and the second one has two.
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a noun clause and the verb. There should be no comma there. I
shouldn't be focusing on this, but I can't help it.
.... [I]s liable for a default judgment obtained on covered claims,
where the claims as alleged involved no factual assertions
which . . . ." I can't read this. Did nobody edit this brief?
. . . [B]rought them within any exclusion and where circum-
stances,"-there should be no comma there-"subsequently . . ..
I'm finding it very difficult to read this.
Let's find a case that we can decide. I just want to find a case
where I can understand the issue from reading it, and I can under-
stand none of the ones so far.
Let's go to Figure 10. Here's a statement of the issues. What is
that monolith of words? Oh my gosh. That's scary. At least they
didn't put it in all caps. I'm going to have to take this one under
advisement.
Let's try the next one, Figure 11.
"Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that provisions
of Wayne County Enrolled Ordinance 2010-514 violate the Public
Employee Retirement System Investment Act . . . ('PERSIA'), be-
cause they purported to permit or require the County not to pay its
entire Annual . . . ." I don't know. What are you talking about? I
have no idea.
How about Figure 12?
"Does New York State Educational Law Section 3020(1), when
read as a whole and when read in the context of its legislative his-
tory, permit continued use of an alternative process of grievance
and arbitration"-I'm not actually familiar with 3020(1)-"for cer-
tain disciplinary matters involving teachers, when the alternative
disciplinary procedures were collectively bargained for between the
Rhinebeck City School District and the Rhinebeck Teachers Associ-
ation prior to . . . ." I don't know. We can't resolve this one. We're
going to have to get back to this one and dig into the brief. We'll set
it aside for now, until I can find a good 45 minutes to try to under-
stand the question.
I spent a year doing that as Judge Reavley's law clerk. Every
brief I saw was something like the ones we've just seen. That was
1984-1985. I was troubled by it. I was disgusted by the fact that
everybody was bringing issues that were incomprehensible unless
you read 50 pages to understand the issue. It was very wasteful.
They were wasting my time as a law clerk. They were wasting
Judge Reavley's time. It's very difficult for a judge to write a good
judicial opinion when the state of the briefing is this way.
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ISSUES PRESENTED
Municipalities, like CPS, are unique political bodies with the
power to engage in private, proprietary functions. As a result, for more
than 130 years, Texas has withheld immunity from suit from
municipalities in suits, including those based in contract, that arise out
of a municipality's performance of proprietary functions.
The instant case arises out of CPS's refusal to pay Backhose
its contractual retainage of $4.1 million for services relation to CPS's
operation and maintenance of a public utility, a proprietary function.
CPS never disputed the services were fully performed more than eight
years ago in 2007 by Backhose when it demanded payment of its
retainage. Despite these facts, CPS filed two separate pleas to the
jurisdiction to deny Backhose its right to the retainage in four years
of litigation and appeals since 2011.
The second interlocutory appeal between Backhose and CPS
in this case presents the following issues for decision by this Court:
1) Does CPS enjoy immunity from suit against Backhose's claim
for attorney's fees even though this suit arises out of CPS's
performance of a proprietary function as a public utility?
2) Did this Court's opinion in Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325
(Tex. 2006) grant municipalities immunity from suit when they
enter into contracts and thereby abrogate the proprietary function
doctrine and impliedly overrule Gates v. City of Dallas, 704
S.W.2d 737 (Tex. 1986) and Boiles v. City of Abilene, 276 S.W.2d
922 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1955, writ ref d)?
3) Does a court's proprietary-governmental function analysis
regarding a municipality's immunity from suit in a particular case
focus on the nature of the municipality's relationship with the
State of Texas or on the particular claims asserted by a plaintiff?
4) Was dismissal of Backhose's attorney's fees claim premature
or otherwise improper due to a lack of discovery into CPS's
pleadings that may have waived immunity from suit?
Figure 10
The judge who turns to the "issues presented" for an easy intro-




COUNTER-STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that provisions of Wayne County
Enrolled Ordinance 2010-514 violate the Public Employee Retirement System
Investment Act, MCL 38.1132 et seq ("PERSIA"), because they purported to
permit or require:
* the County not to pay its entire Annual Required Contribution (ARC)
* the Trustees to move dedicated Inflation Equity Fund trust assets out of
the IEF reserve for a purpose other than distribution of 13th checks;
* the use of IEF trust funds to offset the County's ARC, in violation of the
exclusive benefit rule, and
* the Trustees to engage in a transaction for the benefit of the County for
less than adequate consideration, in violation of the prohibited transaction
rule?
The Court of Appeals says no.
The Retirement System says no.
Whether any constitution, statute, or charter provision gives the County the power
to direct the movement of trust funds from the Retirement System's IEF reserve?
The Court of Appeals says no.
The Retirement System says no.
Whether the County's failure to pay its ARC violates the Michigan Constitution's
Pension Clause, Const 1963, art 9, §24?
The Court of Appeals did not answer the question.
The Retirement System says yes.
Figure 11
Here we have the traditional whether-issue with four bulleted
points embedded within it, all preceding the question mark. By the
third line, two statutes have been cited, and the reader, almost cer-
tainly knowing neither of them, is expected to read on regardless.
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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the rules
of this Court, and pursuant to New York CPLR § 5602(a)(1)(i) because the action
originated in Monroe County Supreme Court, and this appeal is from unanimous
order of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department which finally determined the
action and is not appealable as of right.
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW BY THIS COURT
Does New York State Education Law Section 3020(1), when read as a whole
and when read in the context of its legislative history, permit continued use of an
alternative process of grievance and arbitration for certain disciplinary matters
involving teachers, when the alternative disciplinary procedures were collectively
bargained for between the Rhinebeck City School District and the Rhinebeck
Teachers Association prior to September 1, 1994, and have remained unaltered by
renegotiation?
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This motion arises out of a CPLR Article 78 petition filed by Roxanne
Hardt (hereinafter "Hardt") in Monroe County Supreme Court, in which Hardt
sought to annul discipline, in the form of a thirty-day suspension, imposed against
Figure 12
Again, the issue immediately presents us with an unfamiliar
code number, asking us to understand the statute as a whole, to-
gether with its legislative history-when we don't even know what




So in 1985, having finished my clerkship, I thought that there
must be a better way. Surely a legal problem can be stated so that
people can actually understand it. This quest for such a method took
me on a seven-year odyssey to try to find a better way of stating a
legal problem. I studied all the literature on legal issues. Finally, I
developed a method.
I realized that the whether-issue in a single sentence is often
devoid of facts. A lot of people write issue statements that say,
"Whether the trial court erred in issuing its injunction dated Au-
gust 26, 2015." I don't know. What do you think? I don't know. I
need some facts. I must read more.
How do you state a legal problem so that a first-time reader in-
stantly gets it? It's called a deep issue. It's a multisentence issue
statement culminating in a question mark by the 75th word-never
more than 75 words-with law and facts woven in.
The first one I ever framed I had some help with from a wonder-
ful Michigan law professor, the late Frank Cooper. His son, Ed
Cooper, still teaches at Michigan. But the great Frank Cooper wrote
an ABA Journal article in 1953 in which he talked about all the
common failings of legal issues.
Frank Cooper cited what he thought was the ideal legal issue.
It was a one-sentence issue beginning with Whether. Here is the
issue statement that he praised in 1953 in the ABA Journal:
Whether an alien, born in Bohemia, then a part of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, in 1905, who later became a Czecho-Slo-
vakian citizen when the place of his birth was included in that
country after World War I and who, after the Munich Pact of
1938 while in the United States, petitioned to be and was rec-
ognized as a German citizen is [Finally, we reach the verb!] now
a citizen or subject of an enemy country within the meaning of
the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, despite the reoccupation of the
territory of his birth and former residence by Czechoslovakia.
Hey, Frank Cooper says that's perfect. Well, he had a point that
it's good. But it struck me as a young man in my mid-twenties that
there had to be a better way. Because I'm also a grammarian, I care
a lot about syntax.
You know, the problem with that issue statement is that there
are ten imbedded phrases between the subject and the verb. What
if we unpacked that sentence, put it into separate sentences, and
then posed the question at the end? The same issue. It's called a
deep issue.
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This was the first deep issue I ever framed. I did it in 1992. Here
it is:
Under the Enemy Alien Act of 1798, German citizens are con-
sidered enemy aliens. In 1905, Richl was born in Bohemia,
which was then part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. After
World War I, his birthplace became known as Czechoslovakia,
and Richl became a Czechoslovakian citizen. After the Munich
Pact of 1938, while Richl was in the United States, he peti-
tioned to be and was recognized as a German citizen. Should he
be considered an enemy alien?
It's the same issue unpacked. Put it in a few shorter sentences,
put it in chronological order, and suddenly it becomes more compre-
hensible. It's called a deep issue. It's a multisentence issue state-
ment culminating in a question mark by the 75th word, with law
and facts woven in.
Now, you may be thinking, "Oh, but Bryan, there's a rule. You
have to begin issues with the word Whether, and it's got to be put
into a single sentence fragment." No, it doesn't.
Let's look at some examples of deep issues, and here I will ask
Professor Moriarty to be my helper. In The Winning Brief, Tip #12,
I've collected dozens of them. Professor Moriarty, let's say I'm a
judge trying to get caught up on my docket. Choose any issue on
page 98.
PROFESSOR MORIARTY: For a criminal-sentencing enhance-
ment to be constitutional, the enhancement must be either found
by the jury or admitted by the defendant. At Smith's sentencing,
the government conceded that Smith's three-level-organizer sen-
tencing enhancement was neither found by the jury nor admitted
by Smith-yet the court imposed it anyway. Is Smith entitled to
resentencing without the enhancement?
PROFESSOR GARNER: I think he is. I have just decided that.
But no . . . I'm a careful judge. Now I know what I'm looking for in
the brief. I just want to confirm that that's right. I think I'm just
about ready to decide. Isn't it lovely being able to decide questions
like this?
Let's have another. Any one you like.
PROFESSOR MORIARTY: The Fair Housing Act requires hous-
ing providers to make reasonable accommodations in any pet policy
when a disabled person needs the assistance of a service animal.
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Mary Anderson, an intellectually disabled tenant, has a medically
prescribed emotional-support dog. The landlord threatened to evict
Mary because her dog exceeded his pet policy's height-and-weight
limits. Has he violated the Act?
PROFESSOR GARNER: I think he has. I'm about ready to hold
that he has violated it. But as a judge, I say, "Wait." I just want to
be sure. I want to confirm in the brief that this is correct. I want to
see your citations to the record. I'm just about ready to decide this
one. Hey, I'm getting caught up on my docket.
Let's go to the next page. Any one you would like, Professor Mo-
riarty.
PROFESSOR MORIARTY: Under Louisiana law, a corporation
must include all debt in its corporate-franchise tax base. Louisi-
ana's highest court has long held that an advance is not debt if the
borrower is not obligated to repay it. Bayou Boats receives advances
on its corporate-owned life-insurance policies, but it has no obliga-
tion to repay them. Must Bayou Boats include the advances as debt
in its tax base?
PROFESSOR GARNER: I don't think so. I'm just about ready to
decide that one. Hey, we're clearing off the docket pretty quickly.
By the way, do you know how many lawyers would take 12 pages
to say what that issue says in 67 words? Do you think it becomes
more powerful over 12 pages? I don't think so. That very question
becomes obscure when you spread over 12 pages what you can say
in 67 words.
Do you know what the most important thing about the deep is-
sue is? The 75-word limit. I discovered this when I was first devel-
oping the deep issue. I was experimenting. I was writing lots of deep
issues. I was doing judicial-writing seminars, and I was beleaguer-
ing the judges in a way-on coffee breaks. I would say, "Judge,
would you have a look at this issue?"
If it was 93 words, the judge would say, "You know, Bryan, I'm
trying to get some coffee right now. I'll have a look at it before the
day is out." Okay. But if it was 72 words, the judge would say, "Sure"
and be willing to embark on it then and there. There's something
about the bulkiness of long issue statements. They're off-putting.
By distilling the issue into 75 or fewer words, you're making it eas-
ier for the reader.
Also, having done thousands of them, I've found that you can
always frame an issue within 75 words. I haven't found otherwise
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in any examples, and that's why I provided so many dozens of ex-
amples in The Winning Brief.
One more, Professor Moriarty. Any issue you would like.
PROFESSOR MORIARTY: The Eleventh Amendment immunizes
states and their "alter egos" from federal lawsuits. The Supreme
Court defines "alter egos" as those entities whose judgments must
be paid from the state's treasury because they are substantially con-
trolled by the state. Here, Transport's enabling statute prohibits
judgments against it from being paid from the state treasury-and
the state has only limited control over Transport. Does Transport
enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit?
PROFESSOR GARNER: Well, I think we have seen enough illus-
trations of how this works. I propose that we replace Pennsylvania
Rule of Appellate Procedure 21.16(a) with Figure 13, a model court
rule.
A PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICE: It shall be taken
under advisement. [Laughter.]
PROFESSOR GARNER: Excellent. It shall be taken under advise-
ment.
So let's look at Figure 13. There's a court rule. You would elicit
better issue statements from lawyers and pro se litigants alike. The
examples are a necessary part of the rule. People have to know what
to do-how to do it.
PROPOSAL #2: FOOTNOTED CITATIONS
My second proposal: If we're serious about making legal writing
better, we must clean up the cluttered text itself by more widely
adopting footnoted citations. We should ban parentheticals from ci-
tations, except in footnotes. We should discuss leading cases in the
text-and there should be no doubt about the age and authority of
our precedents. Readers should never have to skip up and down on
the page to look at footnotes. Nothing should appear there except
bibliographic numbers etc.
What's the problem with citations in the body? Well, let's say
you're a judge. Again, a beleaguered judge. You've got way too much
reading material.
Take a look at Figure 14. Oh my gosh. This is all quotations
pasted together with citations. You know, if you don't like writing,
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Model Rule for Issue Statements in Briefs
Rule 28. Briefs
(a) Appellant's Brief. The appellant's brief must contain, under appropriate headings
and in the order indicated:
(1) a statement of the issues presented for eview, with no other information on the
page, expressed in this form:
(A) each issue must include dispassionately phrased legal and factual premises
in separate sentences, leading up to the final sentence ending with a
question mark;
(B) no citations should appear within the issues presented;
(C) the facts included in the issue must be concise and chronological;
(D) no single issue presented may exceed 75 words;
(E) no issue may begin with whether or be phrased in a single sentence; and
(F) if two or more issues are presented, each should be prefaced with a concise,
neutral heading, which does not count toward the 75-word limit;
(G) the issues presented should be modeled on these examples:
* Federal circuit courts may hear and rule on final orders only. Summary-
judgment orders granting foreclosure are not considered final orders.
Wilson has appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on
First Bank's foreclosure count. Is that appeal properly before this court?
* For a criminal-sentencing enhancement to be constitutional, the
enhancement must be either found by the jury or admitted by the
defendant. At Smith's sentencing, the Government conceded that
Smith's three-level-organizer sentencing enhancement was neither found
by the jury nor admitted by Smith-yet the Court imposed it anyway. Is
Smith entitled to resentencing without the enhancement?
* At trial, the chief prosecutor mentioned in closing that Jeffries had
decided to represent himself at trial-a statement thatJeffries did not
object to at the time or in his motion for new trial. On appeal, Jeffries
raises the objection for the first time. Did he properly preserve this
complaint for appellate review?
Figure 13
This is my model rule for questions presented in appellate briefs.
It would help appellate judges elicit better work product from the
lawyers who appear before them. The exemplars in (G) are necessary
illustrations if the bar is to understand what is expected. The appel-
lee's brief must contain its own issue statement, presumably with
premises differing from those in the appellant's, but otherwise follow-
ing the same requirements.
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(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence admissible
under G.S. 150B-29(a), 150B-30, or 150B-31 in
view of the entire record as submitted; or
(6) Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
N.C.G.S. § 150B-51 (b) (2012).
An appellate court reviewing a superior court order
regarding an agency decision "'examines the trial court's order
for error of law. The process has been described as a two-fold
task: (1) determining whether the trial court exercised the
appropriate scope of review and, if appropriate, (2) deciding
whether the court did so properly.'" ACT-UP Triange v. Comm'n
for Health Servs., 345 N.C. 699, 706, 483 S.E.2d 388, 392
(1997). The standard of review to be employed by the court on
judicial review of an agency decision depends on the particular
issues presented by the parties. Matter of Darryl Burke
Chevrolet, Inc., 131 N.C. App. 31, 505 S.E.2d 581 (1998), aff'd,
350 N.C. 83, 511 S.E.2d 639 (1999). The reviewing court may be
required to utilize both the "whole record" and the "de novo"
standards of review, when reviewing an agency decision, if
warranted by the nature of the issues raised. Skinner v. North
Carolina Dept. Of Correction, 154 N.C. App. 270, 572 S.E.2d 184
(2002) .
A de novo standard of review applies to claims that an
agency violated a constitutional provision, was in excess of
statutory authority, made a decision upon unlawful procedure or
made some other error of law. Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 185 N.C. App. 566, 649 S.E.2d 410 (2007). Similarly,
Figure 14
The middles of briefs often contain page after page of text resem-
bling this. Many in our profession have simply become inured to it.
Notice that the average case citation occupies two full lines.
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judicial review of whether an agency decision was based on an
error of law requires de novo review. Hodgkins v. North Carolina
Real Estate Com'n, 130 N.C. App. 626, 504 S.E.2d 789 (1998); see
Associated Mechanical Contractors, Inc. V. Payne, 342 N.C. 825,
467 S.E.2d 398 (1996) (applying de novo review to statutory
interpretation); Matter of Darryl Burke Chevrolet, Inc., 131
N.C. App. 31, 505 S.E.2d 581 (1998) (statutory construction is
de novo), aff'd, 350 N.C. 83, 511 S.E.2d 639 (1999).
In a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew
and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the
Commission. In re Appeal of the Greens of Pine Glen Ltd.
P'ship, 356 N.C. 642, 646-47, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003). "De
novo review" requires the court to consider a question anew, as
if not considered or decided by the agency previously, and to
make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law rather than
relying upon those made by the agency. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. V. North Carolina Dept. Of Environment & Natural Resources,
148 N.C. App. 610, 560 S.E.2d 163 (2002).
When the issue on appeal is whether the agency's decision
was supported by substantial evidence or whether the agency's
decision was arbitrary and capricious, the reviewing court must
apply the "whole record" test. ACT-UP Triangle, 345 N.C. at
706, 483 S.E.2d at 392; Associated Mechanical Contractors v.
Payne, 342 N.C. 825, 832, 467 S.E.2d 398, 401 (1996); Powell v.
North Carolina Dept. Transportation, 347 N.C. 614, 623, 499
S.E.2d 180, 185 (1998). The "whole record" test requires the
Figure 14 (cont'd)
Does anybody actually read these sentences or consult these
cases? Or is this just boilerplate filler on the standard of review?
Notice, again, the ugliness of the Courier typeface and the typewrit-
ing-throwback effect of the underlining (as opposed to italics).
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law is the place to be. Of all literary professions, this is the place to
be because just two sentences will fill up a page if you bulk them up
with citations. This example continues like this not for just 2 pages,
but for 50. And you're reading this stuff day in and day out. Lawyers
get accustomed to it.
And Figure 15: Well, the reason we put citations up in the body
is so people can plainly see where we've made Bluebook errors, as
in not abbreviating Management and Property.
And by the way, at the bottom of the first page and over to the
second is a one-sentence paragraph. The sentence has 13 words-
only 13 words, just one independent clause-and all those citations.
And those of you who are law students know very well that this was
the most irksome thing when you began law school: learning what
to do with all those mid-text citations.
Do you remember, in your first two weeks of law school, reading
a sentence that said, "An employer is not responsible for the acting
agent who's acting outside the scope and course of his employment.
See Flom v. Baumgartner, 92 Pa. 46 ... ," and asking yourself, "Am
I going to have to remember this?" And you learn in your first two
weeks of law school that no, you don't have to remember that. You
don't even have to read it. That's why we put it there. You're just
supposed to skip over that stuff. It just means there's some support
for the preceding sentence.
Imagine a world in which you can actually read every word on
the page and still know what the authority is. Imagine a world
where people actually write, "Three years ago in Flom v. Baumgart-
ner, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that so and so." You
know that Flom is the leading case. You know it's three years old.
You know it's the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. You don't know
the volume number and page number where it appears. You proba-
bly don't need to know that on your first read. But you know where
to find it when you do need to know.
Imagine not having to waste mental power by skipping over all
this nonsubstantive stuff-which is exactly what lawyers have to
do now. Lawyers tell me all the time, "I want to write really well.
Just show me how I can do that with citations in the body. I will
try."
But trying to write well with citations in the body is like trying
to become a PGA-class golfer in Fritzville. You're handicapped in
what you can do. Guess what? Lawyers aren't writing paragraphs.
They're not writing real paragraphs. Your seventh-grade teacher




D. Texas Courts Reject XuXu's nullity argument.
Texas courts have rejected XuXu's formalistic approach, See,
e.g., GQ Enterprises Corp. V Rajami, No. 015-12-0353-CV, 2014 WL
215200 (Tex. App.-Dallas, May 22, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in defaulting pro se
corporate defendant after warning it to retain counsel or face
default); Simmons, Jannace & Stagg, L.L.P. v. The Buzbee Law
Firm, 324 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no
pet.) (Brown J) (dismissing pro se partnership's appeal after
warning it to retain counsel or face dismissal of appeal); and
Forrest Property Management, Inc. V. McGinnis, No. 10-10-00273-
CV, 2010 WL 4572384 (Tex. App.-Waco, Nov. 2010, no pet.)
(same).
E. The Majority of Other Jurisdictions Reject XuXu's
Nullity Argument.
Although a few states have adopted XuXu's formalistic
approach, see, e.g., State ex rel. commission on Unauthorized
Practice of Law v. Tyler, 811 N.W.678, 681 & n.3 (Neb. 2012); Nerri
v. Adu Gyanfi, 613 S.E.2d 429, 430 (Va. 2005); Davenport v. Lee, 72
S.W.3d 85, 93094 (Ark. 2002); Black v. Baptist Medical Center, 575
So.2d 1087, 1088 (Ala. 1991); and Stevens v. Jas. A. Smith Lumber
Co., 222 N.W. 665, 666 (S.D. 1929), others have rejected it, see, e.g.,
Figure 15
Does this qualify as legal argument? Does it even qualify as
prose writing? What sort of grade would it get from a seventh-grade
English teacher? Almost everything about the passage bespeaks
poor judgment.
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Torrey v. Leesburg Regional Medical Center, 769 So.2d 1040, 1041
(Fla. 2000) (complaint signed by unlicensed attorney is an
amendable defect and not a nullity); H & H Development, LLC v.
Ramlow, 272 P.3d 657, 662-63 (Mont. 2012) (pro se complaint filed
by limited liability company not a nullity and subject to curve); Save
Our Creeks v. City of Brooklyn Park, 699 N.W.2d 307, 308 (Minn.
2005) (same); Boydston v. Strole Development Co., 969 P.2d 653,
656 (Ariz. 1998) (en blanc) (same); Richardson v. Dodson, 832
S.W.2d 888, 889-90 (Ky. 1992) (same); North Carolina Nat'l Bank
v. Virginia Carolina Builders, 299 S.E.2d 629 (N.C. 1983) (same);
and Applebaum v. Rush University Medical Center, 899 N.E.2d
262, 429 (Ill. 2008) (rule should only be invoked when there is no
other alternative remedy).
Every federal circuit court confronted with XuXu's argument
has rejected it. See In re IFC Credit Corp., 663 F.3d at 317
(bankruptcy petition signed by corporation's non-lawyer president
was not a "nullity" that would render bankruptcy proceedings
"void"); Memon v. Allied Domecq QSR, 385 F.3d 871, 873-74 (5th
Cir. 2004) (district court's dismissal of corporation's uncounseled
complaint without prior warning that corporations could not
proceed pro se was abuse of discretion; Harrison v. Wahatoyas,




Did you know that this is the most controversial topic in legal
writing today? It made the front page of The New York Times.'
Judge Posner has debated me on the point.2 Justice Scalia has de-
bated me on the point.3 Both fared about the same.
Here's Figure 16: an opinion by the beloved Justice Stevens.
Look at the left-hand side. You see I'm not making this stuff up.
Let's change our analogy from golf to swimming. Let's say you
go to a swimming instructor and say, "I want to learn competitive
swimming. But I must always wear a three-piece suit while swim-
ming, if you don't mind. No. It's a rule. I've got to wear a three-piece
suit while swimming. But I want to be a competitive swimmer."
Well, good luck.
We're professional writers of nonfiction. Who's going to read this
stuff? Judges, other lawyers, law students-even laypeople. Look
how you could read it. You could read every word with my revision
in the right-hand column [Fig. 16].
By the way, the idea that the left column of Figure 16 is easier
to read on a tablet or computer screen is pure folderol. There's noth-
ing about on-screen reading that makes in-line citations preferable.
They're as ghastly on the screen as they are on the page.
Okay. So the question is presented. My motion is that we sub-
ordinate all citations. Aristotle defined rhetoric as the art of ampli-
fication and diminution. You amplify certain things on the page.
You diminish certain other things on the page.
What is the most important stuff in Figure 16? The substance.
In the left column, the least important information is getting the
most visual impact-the numbers, the citational stuff that carries
no meaning at all as compared with the ideas and the arguments
and the points that you're making.
This is a highly controversial proposition. It's hard for me to be-
lieve that it is, but again, I feel as if I'm trying to teach golf in Fritz-
ville.
1. See William Glaberson, Legal Citations on Trial in Innovation v. Tradition, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 2001, at 1.
2. See Bryan A. Garner, Clearing the Cobwebs from Judicial Opinions, 38 CT. REV. 4
(2001); Richard A. Posner, Against Footnotes, 38 CT. REV. 24 (2001); Bryan A. Garner, After-
word, 38 CT. REV. 28 (2001); see also Rodney Davis, No Longer Speaking in Code, 38 CT. REV.
26 (2001).
3. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING
JUDGES 132-35 (2008).
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ORIGINAL VERSION
Excerpt from Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool,
121 S.Ct. 1678, 1684-85 (2001) (per Stevens, J.).
Despite the broad discretion that States possess with respect to
the imposition of criminal penalties and punitive damages, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution imposes substantive limits on that dis-
cretion. That Clause makes the Eighth Amendments prohibi-
tion against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punish-
ments applicable to the States. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed. 346 (1972) (per curiam). The Due
Process Clause of its own force also prohibits the States from
imposing "grossly excessive" punishments on tortfeasors,
Gore, 517 U.S., at 562, 116 S.Ct. 1589; TXO Production Corp.,
509 U.S. 443, 453-455, 113 S.Ct. 2711, 126 L.Ed.2d 366
(1993) (plurality opinion).
The Court has enforced those limits in cases involving
deprivations of life, Enmund v. Florida, 485 U.S. 782, 787, 801,
102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) (death is not "a valid
penalty under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for one
who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to
take life"); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861,
53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (opinion of White, J.) (sentence of
death is "grossly disproportionate" and excessive punishment
for the crime of rape); deprivations of liberty, Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. at 279, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for nonviolent felonies is "significantly
disproportionate"); and deprivations of property, United States
v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d
314 (1998) (punitive forfeiture of $357,144 for violating
reporting requirement was "grossly disproportional" to the
gravity of the offense); Gore, 517 U.S., at 585-586, 116 S.Ct.
1589 ($2 million punitive damages award for failing to advise
customers of minor predelivery repairs to new automobiles
was "grossly excessive" and therefore unconstitutional).
In these cases, the constitutional violations were predicated
on judicial determinations that the punishments were "grossly
disproportional to the gravity of ... defendant[s' offense[s]."
Bajakajian, 524 U.S., at 334, 118 S.Ct. 2028; see also Gore, 517
U.S., at 585-586, 116 S.Ct. 1589; Solem, 463 U.S., at 303, 103
S.Ct. 3001; Coker, 433 U.S., at 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861 (opinion of
White, J.). We have recognized that the relevant constitutional
line is "inherently imprecise," Bajakajian, 524 U.S., at 336, 118
S.Ct. 2028, rather than one "marked by a simple mathematical
formula," Gore, 517 U.S., at 582, 116 S.Ct. 1589. But in decid-
ing whether that line has been crossed, we have focused on the
same general criteria: the degree of the defendant's reprehensi-
bility or culpability, see e.g., Bajakajian, 524 U.S., at 337, 118
S.Ct. 2028; see also Gore, 517 U.S., at 575-580, 116 S.Ct. 1589;
Solem, 463 U.S., at 290-291, 103 S.Ct. 3001; Enmund, 485 U.S.,
at 798, 102 S.Ct. 3368; Coker, 433 U.S., at 598, 97 S.Ct. 2861
(opinion of White, J.); the relationship between the penalty
and the harm to the victim caused by the defendants actions,
see Bajakajian, 524 U.S., at 339, 118 S.Ct. 2028; see also Gore,
REVISED WITH CIRATIONS IN FOOTNOTES
Edited Version of Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool,
121 S.Ct. 1678, 1684-85 (2001).
The States have broad discretion to impose criminal penalties
and punitive damages. But that discretion is substantively lim-
ited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution. It prohibits the States from impos-
ing "grossly excessive" punishments on tortfeasors.1 And it
makes the Eighth Amendments prohibition against excessive
fines and cruel and unusual punishments applicable to the
States.
2 








Clause is violated if a levied punishment is "grossly dispropor-
tional to the gravity of ... defendant[s] offense[s]."6 Instead
of an explicit formula applicable to all cases,
7 
we examine
objective criteria to decide whether a penalty is grossly dispro-
portionate. We must consider (1) the degree of the defendant's
reprehensibility or culpability (2) the relationship between
the penalty and the harm to the victim roused by the defen-
dant's actions,
9 
and (3) the sanctions imposed in other cases
for comparable misconduct.10 Each criterion must be exam-
ined independently."1
1. Gore, 517 U.S., at 562, 116 S.Ct. 1589; TXO Production Corp., 509
U.S. 443, 453-455, 113 S.Ct. 2711, 126 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993) (plu-
rality opinion).
2. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 LEd. 346
(1972) (per curiam).
3. Enmund v Florida, 485 U.S. 782, 787, 801, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73
L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) (death is not "a valid penalty under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for one who neither took
life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life"); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,592, 97 S.Ct. 2861,53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977)
(opinion of White, J.) (sentence of death is "grossly dispropor-
tionate" and excessive punishment for the crime of rape).
4. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. at 279, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole for nonviolent felonies is "signif-
icantly disproportionate").
5. United States .Bajakajias, 524 U.S. 321, 324,118 S.Ct. 2028, 141
L.Ed.2d 314 (1998) (punitive forfeiture of $357,144 for violating
reporting requirement was "grossly disproportional" to the grav-
ity of the offense); Gore, 517 U.S., at 585-586, 116 S.Ct 1589 ($2
million punitive damages award for failing to advise customers of
minor predelivery repairs to new automobiles was "grossly exces-
sive" and therefore unconstitutional).
6. Bajakajlan, 524 U.S., at 334, 118 S.Ct. 2028; see also Gore, 517
U.S., at 585-586, 116 S.Ct. 1589; Solem, 463 U.S., at 303, 103
5.CL 3001; Coker, 433 U.S., at 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861 (opinion of
White, J.).
7. Bajakajian, 524 U.S., at 336, 118 S.Ct. 2028 (noting inherent
imprecision of measuring excessiveness); Gore, 517 U.S., at 582,
116 S.Ct. 1589 (acknowledging disproportionality is not "marked
by a simple mathematical formula") .
8. See, e.g., Bajakajian, 524 U.S., at 337, 118 S.CL 2028; see also
Gore. 517 U.S.. at 575-580. 116 S.Ct. 1589: Solem. 463 U.S.. at
Figure 16
In the days of typewriters, the legal profession became inured to
the type of clogged prose you see in the left column. The advent of
computers exacerbated the problem with the ease of the copy-paste
function, aggravated still further by the ease with which cases can
be located with ready-made parentheticals to displace actual prose.
Hampered by a perceived obligation to encumber their writing with
citations coupled with parentheticals, both lawyers and judges
themselves struggle to compose coherent paragraphs. Note how
much more efficiently ideas are conveyed by the right-hand column.
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PROPOSAL #3: POINT HEADINGS
After the issue statements at the beginning of a brief, the most
important thing in a brief is the point headings. They are prominent
throughout the middle part of the writing.
Proposal 3: Lawyers everywhere should adopt the U.S. Solicitor
General's standards for point headings:
* complete sentences of 15-30 words (only in the argument sec-
tion);
* down-style typesetting-no initial caps or all caps; and
* progression from major to minor premises, followed by points
in rebuttal.
Let's look at some tables of contents from briefs around the
country: look at Figure 17. Stipulate that the issue statements were
worthless to us in this brief. Instead, let's look at the table of con-
tents. Oh dear. Boy, they're really making this hard.
Many judges have told me that the most shocking thing is how
difficult it is to decipher or excavate the arguments of counsel. The
argument shouldn't require any excavation at all. The lawyer
should be putting it in high relief right here.
Let's try another. Look at Figure 18. Oh dear. That's the way it
prints out. That's what the judges are seeing.
Next: Figure 19. Now, I shouldn't be caught up on the fact that
lawyers are trying to do initial capitals. Yes that's bad. But here
they're doing initial capitals incorrectly. There's a rule about initial
capitals: all style manuals say that even if you're doing initial cap-
itals, you must lowercase prepositions, articles, and conjunctions of
four or fewer letters.4 In other words, if you're going to do initial
caps, you have to know your parts of speech. But this one is capital-
izing the. And why am I focusing on that? I just can't help it. I'm
sorry, but it's hard to find a table of contents that doesn't have these
kinds of capitalization errors.
And here's something else-underlining. Underlining is a relic
of the typewriter era, when it meant "I would have italicized this if
I could, but I couldn't." That's what underlining means. I find it very
difficult to look at that page.
Also, look at how you've got (a), (b), and (c). Points (a) and (b)
are phrases, but then (c) is a complete sentence. I don't know what
4. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 8(a), at 91 (Columbia Law Re-
view Ass'n et al. eds., 20th ed. 2015); BRYAN A. GARNER, THE WINNING BRIEF 430-37 (3d ed.
2014); BRYAN A. GARNER, THE REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE § 2.10, at 67-68 (3ded.
2013).
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Who knows what happened at the law office to cause this?
Granted that it would have been bad even without the typographic
glitch on the first line of the point heading. That weird problem
might lead court personnel to dub this the "Unabomber Brief."
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR ............................................... 1
ISSUES PERTAINING TO ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............................................1
A R G U M EN T ......................................................................... 1
1. This Court Should Reconsider Its Holding State v.
Burke Because Washington State Case Law
Interpreting The Double Jeopardy Clause Is
Irreconcilably Inconsistent With Federal Case
Law Interpreting The Double Jeopardy
C lause................................................................... 5
a. Double Jeopardy ............................. 5
b. Implied Acquittal.............................8
c. After Burke II was decided, Burke's
federal writ for habeas corpus was
granted prohibiting the Pierce County
Prosecuting Attorney from retrying her
on the more serious homicide by abuse
charges after the jury left that verdict
form blank........................................12
2. Public Policy Considerations Support Mr.
Isaacs's Request for Relief...................................18
E. CONCLUSION.................................................................20
Figure 19
Many odd judgments have gone into the production of this
page-one poor decision after another: the margins, the length of the
indents, the capitalizing (with initial capitalization attempted but
incorrectly executed), the underlining, the uneven right margin, and
the lack of parallelism in (a), (b), and (c).
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that's all about. Are (a) and (b) less important than (c)? They should
all be parallel constructions-all phrases or all sentences.
Next: Figure 20. Oh dear, all caps and boldface throughout. Yes-
terday Justice Todd told me over dinner, "When I see a lawyer using
all caps, I just assume that the lawyer's shouting at me, shrieking
at me." It's also hard to read when the heading is more than a few
words long. Let's move on.
Figure 21: Oh dear. Well now, why would I get caught up on
matters of form? The first point heading is trying to do initial capi-
tals but doing them incorrectly because this and that should be cap-
italized. It's doing them incorrectly. But notice as well that the
writer gave up even trying on Propositions of Law 2 and 3: no initial
capping. Now, why should I be so focused on form? I don't know.
Maybe it's just a turn of mind. But if I'm so distracted from the sub-
stance of this brief, maybe the judge will be as well. Next.
Look at Figure 22. Oh dear. This is a terrorist, I think. It's amaz-
ing the number of point headings and issue statements that look
like ransom notes. It's scary. Let's keep moving.
Figure 23: This one is bunched up and unsightly. Justice Scalia
looked at that Point II, "The appellate division failed to consider the
legislative history of," and said, "Well good for them. Good for
them."
By the way, even in jurisdictions where you do use legislative
history, we generally look at it only in cases of ambiguity. But here,
Point I says that the statute is absolutely clear on its face. Point II
is, oh, they failed to look at-what are you talking about? Do you
even know the law of your jurisdiction?
Okay. Let's go on to Figure 24. Oh, man. Well, this is somebody
who knows how to full-justify and therefore doesn't mind creating
huge potholes in the middle of a line.
By the way, look at Matthew Butterick's book Typography for
Lawyers. It's full of wise advice about typography. But you hope
your opponents don't. The nice thing about having adversaries pro-
ducing briefs that look like this is the number of briefs that imme-
diately tell the judge, "I have no idea what I'm doing, Judge. I don't
know how I was even admitted to the Bar."
Did you notice the typos? There is one each in IV(a) and (b). If
you do point headings like this, at least nobody's going to notice
your typos because nobody's going to be trying to read your head-
ings in the first place. They'll just move on. So will we.
Now to Figure 25. Kentucky has a weird rule. They put all the
citations not only mid-text, but also in the middle of the table of
contents. Every case cited. Oh dear. Next!
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Figure 20
By comparison with its predecessors, this table of contents isn't
looking so bad. But it isn't well done-what with the all-caps text
and the boldfacing throughout. The phrasing of the point headings






IN TR O D U CTIO N ................................................................................................................. 1
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................1
II. ARGUMENT.......................................................................................3
Proposition of Law 1..............................................................................................3
Secretary Benjamin Is Not a Proper Party to this Action; There Are No Allegations
that He Was Directly Involved in the Matter or Failed to Perform a Clear Legal
Duty
Proposition of Law 2..............................................................................................5
The doctrine of laches bars Relators' Complaint because they waited too long to
file.
Proposition of Law 3..............................................................................................6
The proposed charter amendment is unconstitutional.
III. CONCLUSION.....................................................................................9
Figure 21
This page reeks of eccentricity. In any event, it says nothing il-
luminating about the lawsuit. Mostly the page makes you wonder
about the lawyer and his or her background. What leads to this kind
of work product?
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Figure 22 (cont'd)
The widow/orphan control is important even in the table of con-
tents. But the formatting of the first line of the page is the least of
the problems. Note the typos.
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Figure 23
Compared with the others, this table of contents looks fairly
"normal." At least we can actually read it. But the content seems off:
Point I is plain meaning; Point II is a failure to look at legislative
history, which normally doesn't come into play unless there's an am-
biguity. The points don't jibe as well as they might.
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Figure 24
Just as you turned to this page, your colleague on the bench
called to say that the legislature has approved an early-retirement
plan for judges. You're eligible. If you took it, you would no longer be
staring at stuff like this ten hours a day. Mighty tempting.
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Figure 24 (cont'd)
Go back to the preceding page and try counting the typos in this
table of contents. It isn't easy to focus closely on such ill-designed
pages.
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INTRODUCTION
This is an ordinary medical malpractice ase with an extraordinary opinion from
The Court of Appeals. Tiberius Winfrey, MD, is a radiologist accused of misreading CT
scans. The trial court entered judgment based on the jury's finding that Dr. Winfrey did not
breach the standard of care in his treatment of Appellee's Decedent, Lilith Timothy.
STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT
The Court has indicated that no oral argument will be heard in this matter.
However, Dr. Winfrey respectfully requests that, if the Court reconsiders the issue, he be
granted oral argument regarding the issues he brings before the Court. Counsel for Dr.
Winfrey believes that oral argument would assist he Court in sorting through the extensive
trial record and complex issues, many of which are issues of first impression, especially
the issue of negligent credentialing, before the Court.
STATEMENT OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
IN T R O D U C TIO N ............................................................................................................................. i
STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT..................................................................i
STATEMENT OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES......................................................................n
STA TEM EN T O F TH E CA SE ........................................................................................................ 1
A R G U M E N T ................................................................................................................................... 19
. Preservation of Issues........................................................................................................... 19
Kentucky Rule of Evidence 403................................................................................................... 19
IL ISSUE 1: Should an Appellate Court Look at a Cold Record Only and Engage in
a De Novo Evidentiary Review of a KRE 403 Ruling to Find Prejudice Where the
Trial Judge, Who Is Able to Discern and Weigh the Improper Inference that a
Local Jury Would Draw, Had Conducted an Extensive Hearing on the Issue and
Determined that the Risk of Unfair Prejudice Substantially Outweighed Its
Probative V alue?..........................................................................................................22
Figure 25
We hardly know what happened here-except that the intermedi-
ate appellate court has disturbed a jury verdict. The complaints are
presented in a conclusory way here. Notice that the initial caps make
the points hard to read. They force you to avert your eyes.
Future of Appellate Advocacy
Clephas v. Garlock, 168 S.W.3d 389 (Ky.App.2004)...................................................22
Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90 (Ky.2007)......................................................22
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Figure 25 (cont'd)
If a local rule requires you to intersperse citations within the
table of contents, then of course you must do it. Even so, you must




Look at Figure 26. Here we're talking about ransom notes. And
that's the actual margin of the brief, half an inch-a third of an inch
on the left side-so we could squeeze more words on the page.
Well, how should point headings be done?
Get a load of this: Figures 27 and 28. They're tables of contents
from briefs prepared by the U.S. Solicitor General's Office, and
they're works of art. They're equivalent to performances by the
Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra, a great symphony orchestra, or
the Guarneri Quartet. They're virtuoso performances. They're the
equivalent of Bono singing with U2 on Songs of Innocence, the
acoustic track. They're equivalent to a round of golf played by Jor-
dan Spieth.
It's a beautiful thing about the SG's Office: they know how to do
point headings. Figures 27 and 28 are SG tables of contents repro-
duced in the third edition of my book The Winning Brief. The shaded
boxes explaining aspects of the headings are my own. I'm not really
encouraging you to file a brief with shaded boxes explaining the po-
sitioning of your major and minor premises. Those boxes are for
pedagogical purposes only. But please do notice how rational and
altogether pleasing the pages appear to be in Figures 27 and 28.
Figure 29 is a set of point headings by a prosecutor's office-not
very good. They are redone according to SG style in Figure 30, with
a deep issue as the question presented. That's how it ought to be
done.
LEAVING FRITZVILLE
So I'm suggesting that if we're going to take a train from Fritz-
ville, and we're going to be no longer on the fritz as professional
writers, we need to understand how to state a legal problem in a
way that people can actually comprehend in one reading.
We must remove the numerical pollution from our prose. Cita-
tions have gotten longer and longer. Parentheticals make it worse
and worse. Who came up with parentheticals? Bluebook editors.
And where do the Bluebook editors-law-review students-put
their citations? In footnotes, and parentheticals are fine there. The
Bluebook is destroying advocacy for practitioners by encouraging so
many parentheticals.
Finally, we need to know a thing or two about how to do point
headings. Lawyers should know to compose them early on in the
writing process, to make them down-style (without initial capitals),
and to ensure that the propositions hold together and form a solid
edifice of argument.
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As a whole, the profession doesn't know and doesn't do any of
these things very well, so I suggest that we all hop on the first train
out of Fritzville.
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Figure 26
Have you concluded by now that point headings and tables of
contents are only haphazardly taught-or not taught at all-in law
schools? I think that conclusion is quite correct. One advantage of
the typical table of contents is that its form tends to hide the typos
strewn throughout.
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Figure 27
This orderly progression of propositions is sheer perfection. The
points in refutation come toward the end of the middle part of the
brief.
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Figure 28
Considerable artistry goes into fitting propositions together in
this way. As you can imagine, those point headings cannot be an af-
terthought. They must be carefully plotted before the brief is writ-
ten-though, admittedly, refined and adjusted as the body of the
brief is developed.
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Figure 29
This prosecutor's brief suffers from many of the shortcomings
we've examined throughout this talk-in both style and content.
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This table of contents is a makeover of Figure 29. Notice that (1)
the deep issue (precisely 75 words) is presented in full here; (2) be-
tween the topical headings "Argument" and "Conclusion," only full-
sentence point headings appear; (3) topical headings (in phrases) are
set in initial capitals, while point headings (full sentences) are set
down-style; and (4) the remade table of contents alone gives a pretty
full picture and highly understandable view of the case-so much so
that a judge might be inclined to rule from reading it alone.
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